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Who’s Your Daddy?
A Psychoanalytic Exegesis of the Supreme
Court’s Recent Patent Jurisprudence
By Gretchen S. Sween, Ph.D., J.D. *
. . . my sons, who should as sons have helped,
Did nothing: and, one little word from them
Was all I needed, and they spoke no word,
But let me wander on for evermore,
A banished man, a beggar. These two maids
Their sisters, girls, gave all their sex could give,
Food and safe harborage and filial care;
While their two brethren sacrificed their sire
For lust of power and sceptred sovereignty.
No! me they ne’er shall win for an ally . . . .
Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus

I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

Since the Bush administration took office in 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in and decided a dozen patent cases. 1 Considering the Supreme
Court’s pronounced ideological divide, its consistency during this unprecedented
incursion into patent law is even more extraordinary. In each instance it has either
reversed, vacated, and/or remanded the decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in unanimous or nearly unanimous opinions.2 Moreover, the net result of
the Supreme Court’s flurry of reversals has been to constrain, rather than expand, patent
holders’ rights. And the Supreme Court’s rhetoric in formulating its patent decisions has

*
Intellectual Property Litigation Associate, Dechert LLP, Austin, TX; J.D., The University of Texas
School of Law; Ph.D. in Humanities, The University of Texas at Dallas. The views set forth herein are the
personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Dechert LLP or any of its current and
future clients.
1
See discussion at Section II, infra. Because the Supreme Court’s overall docket has decreased
dramatically in the past twenty years, the raw percentage of patent cases on the Court’s docket underscores
even more the degree to which the Supreme Court’s interest in patent cases has increased in recent years.
For instance, during the 2007–2008 term, the Supreme Court heard only 72 cases, as opposed to an average
of 140 cases per term in the 1980s. Thus, the fact that the Supreme Court heard even one patent case that
term is significant—especially since the Court had heard an unprecedented three patent cases in the 2006–
2007 term.
2
Before 2001, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit at a rate similar to its general reversal
rate (approximately 50%), which is considerably lower than its reversal rate of the Ninth Circuit. John F.
Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV.
273, 282 (2002).
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become increasingly disdainful of the Federal Circuit, a specialized court toward which
the Supreme Court had historically been quite deferential.
What message is the Supreme Court sending—and is it the same message that the
Federal Circuit is receiving?
At a June 2008 meeting of the Austin Intellectual Property Law Association
(“IPLA”), 3 United States District Court Judge for the Western District of Texas, Austin
Division, the Honorable Lee Yeakel, suggested that he sees coherence in the Supreme
Court’s recent patent cases. The Judge’s sound observation went something like this: “If
you are wondering what the Supreme Court is doing with all of these patent cases, it
seems to me that the Court is telling the Federal Circuit that patent cases are no different
from any other.” The Supreme Court’s recent patent jurisprudence does indeed reveal a
preference for broad, general principles, while rejecting nuances developed by the
Federal Circuit over the last fifteen years. But does this trend thoroughly explain the
Court’s resurgent interest in a doctrinal area that many consider to be profoundly
abstruse, difficult, and disembodied? And is this trend a “good” one? Is it “fair” to the
patent holders, accused infringers, practitioners, and the specialized court that has been
deeply immersed in these nuances for years? Is the Supreme Court’s commitment to
curbing the Federal Circuit’s perceived overreaching affected by a perception that patent
cases have been afforded an unfair patina and an unfair share of judicial resources based
on their purported difficulty or that patent “trolls” have unfairly accumulated excessive
booty at the expense of an efficient and vibrant market for technological innovation?
Was it fair for Justice Scalia to characterize the Eastern District of Texas, which now has
the busiest patent docket in the nation, as a “renegade jurisdiction” for its perceived role
in the current patent litigation boom? 4 Was it fair for the Eastern District of Texas, led
by Judge T. John Ward, to craft local patent rules that transformed that district into the
busiest patent docket in the nation? 5 Is it fair that the Northern and Southern Districts of
Texas, in an effort to attract more patent suits to their own dockets, have followed suit? 6
Conversely, is it fair that patent cases have, in the past, tended to languish unless
individual courts took a particular interest in seeing them resolved? Is it fair to assume
that what may be a reasonable approach to case management will likewise be a fair way
to approach the concepts underpinning patent disputes? 7 And what does “fair” mean
anyway?
3

The meeting was held on June 17, 2008 at the Westwood Country Club in Austin, Texas.
Justice Scalia made this comment during oral arguments in eBay. See Transcript of Oral Argument at
9, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 846236 (argued Mar.
29, 2006).
5
See, e.g., Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, at C1;
Nate Raymond, Taming Texas, AM. LAW., Mar. 2008, at 100 (exploring how Marshall, Texas, with a
population of about 24,000 and no high-tech industry to speak of, became the preferred venue for patent
holders to file complex, multimillion-dollar, infringement suits).
6
See Gretchen Sween, Living the Rules: The Honorable Judge Sim Lake, ST. BAR LITIG. SEC., NEWS
FOR THE BAR (Texas), Spring 2008, at 20, available at
http://litigationsection.com/downloads/News_for_the_Bar_Spring08.pdf; Gretchen Sween, A View from the
Bench: A Conversation with the Honorable Judge Barbara M.G. Lynn, ST. BAR LITIG. SEC., NEWS FOR THE
BAR (Texas), Fall 2007, at 10–11, available at
http://litigationsection.com/downloads/News%20for%20the%20Bar_Fall%2007.pdf (discussing,
respectively, the decisions of the Southern and the Northern Districts of Texas to adopt local patent rules).
7
Judge Yeakel and his colleague, the Honorable Sam Sparks, in Texas’s Western District have decided
not to adopt special patent-specific local rules. Judge Yeakel has explained this decision by stating that he
4
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This article provides no definitive answers. Instead, it merely holds a mirror up to
the Supreme Court’s recent patent-law holdings and the rhetoric through which those
holdings have been conveyed. The view in the mirror suggests that something more
primal, and less jurisprudential or even political, may account for the Court’s phenomenal
consistency in this doctrinal area of the law.
II. SURVEYING THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT PATENT CASES

¶5

Recognizing the intricacies associated with intellectual property law, Congress in
1982 established the Federal Circuit and tasked this specialized court with harmonizing
the law related to patents. 8 The Federal Circuit, whose exclusive appellate jurisdiction
includes, but is not limited to, all patent claims, is the only Article III appellate court
whose jurisdiction is based on subject matter, not geography. After the Court’s tenth
anniversary, commentators seemed to agree that the Federal Circuit had brought
uniformity to patent law and had ended a type of forum-shopping, since all roads were
leading to Rome and circuit splits could not exist. 9 Thus, as John M. Golden, assistant
professor at The University of Texas School of Law has observed, when the Supreme
Court reverses the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court is not resolving inter-court
conflicts, but is instead replacing the Federal Circuit’s resolutions with the Supreme
Court’s own alternatives. 10 Although the Supreme Court does not pretend to have special
expertise in substantive patent law, during the last six years—beginning with Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 11 decided on May 28, 2002, and culminating,
for now, in Quanta Computers, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 12 decided on June 9, 2008—
the Court has been remarkably consistent in its patent opinions. Several of the Court’s
key patent cases, which reflect an increasing sense of urgency about showing the
specialized court who is boss, are surveyed below.
A. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.

¶6

In Festo, the unanimous Court addressed the relationship between the “doctrine of
equivalents” and “prosecution history estoppel,” concluding that the latter patent-specific
affirmative defense was really just a variation on the broader estoppel doctrine that
precludes a party from taking a position that contradicts a previous position that it has

and Judge Sparks do not believe that “it is fair” to treat patent cases “any differently” from other kinds of
civil lawsuits—or to assume that all patent cases are best managed in a uniform fashion. Thus, Judge
Yeakel’s view of the pattern in the Supreme Court’s recent patent decisions and his decision not to adopt
patent-specific rules align. See supra, note 3.
8
See the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (effective
Oct. 1, 1982), which established the Federal Circuit by merging the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the appellate division of the U.S. Court of Claims.
9
See, e.g., W.L. Hansen et al., Specialized Courts, Bureaucratic Agencies, and the Politics of U.S.
Trade Policy, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 529 (1995); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE
AND REFORM 253 (1996).
10
Professor Golden spoke about this at the George Washington University Law School on September
10, 2008. See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as ‘Prime Percolator’: A Prescription for Appellate
Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
11
535 U.S. 722 (2002).
12
128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).
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taken. 13 Having concluded that prosecution history estoppel is not something special, the
Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s patent-case-specific per se rule and replaced
it with a “flexible bar rule” deemed more “consistent with our precedent”—even as the
Supreme Court admitted that it had never before “weighed the merits” of these two
approaches in any previous case. 14 Instead of a comparative analysis, the Court invoked
nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases in which the doctrine had been formulated; it
then directed courts to “balance” the arguments for prosecution history estoppel against
the overall equities of the inventor’s conduct during prosecution. 15 Seemingly, the
Supreme Court did not believe that any intervening developments justified the Federal
Circuit’s decision to modify the Supreme Court’s (very) old approach.
B. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.
¶7

Similarly, with Holmes Group, the Supreme Court concluded that “arising under”
jurisdiction and the well-pleaded complaint rule should apply no differently in patent
cases than it had “long governed” all other cases. 16 In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Scalia cites a 1913 Supreme Court case for the proposition that determining whether a
case arises under patent law “cannot depend upon the [defendant’s] answer.” 17 Thus, the
Court reasoned, surely a counterclaim cannot serve as the basis for jurisdiction as it
“contravene[s] the longstanding policies underlying our precedents” and would, by
analogy, “radically expand the class of removable cases” and “undermine” the “quick
rule of thumb” that “the longstanding well-pleaded-complaint rule” provides.18 The
decision stripped the Federal Circuit of some of its exclusive jurisdiction, which it had
defined as including any case with a patent law question—including actions where the
patent claim was a request for declaratory relief based on patent infringement brought in
response to non-patent claims.
C. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.

¶8

Then, in Unitherm, the Court again reversed the Federal Circuit by emphasizing
how “our cases” “compel a contrary result” to the one reached by the Federal Circuit.19
The Federal Circuit had decided to review the sufficiency of the evidence presented
during trial of a Walker Process claim, 20 whereby the accused infringer alleged that a
patentee had violated federal antitrust law by seeking to enforce a patent that had been
obtained by defrauding the PTO. The Federal Circuit reviewed the evidence even though
the party that had lost its Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law, and then lost
at trial, had not filed a Rule 50(b) renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law
(notwithstanding the verdict) or, alternatively, a motion for a new trial.
13

535 U.S. 722.
Id. at 738.
15
Id. at 739.
16
535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002).
17
Id. at 831 (citing The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913)).
18
Id.
19
546 U.S. 394, 396 (2006).
20
A “Walker Process claim,” named for a claim pursued in Walker Process Equipment Inc. v. Food
Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), is an affirmative claim brought against a patentee who
has reputedly procured a patent by fraud and engaged in illicit conduct actionable under the antitrust laws.
14
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On one hand, the Unitherm decision is only noteworthy in being particularly
unworthy of note. On the other hand, because the Court elected to take up such a
seemingly prosaic issue, the opinion provides a stark example of the current Supreme
Court’s keen sensitivity to all things emanating from the Federal Circuit. Unitherm first
notes that the Federal Circuit had failed to follow binding regional circuit law, which
required that a motion for a new trial be filed in the trial court before the sufficiency of
the evidence could be reviewed on appeal. 21 After chiding the Federal Circuit for having
“freed” itself from governing authority, the opinion devotes over a page to the full text of
Rule 50 and then several pages to noting that the Supreme Court had, “on several
occasions,” itself made clear that a post-trial Rule 50(b) motion is a procedural
imperative—citing to the “straightforward language employed” in several dusty Supreme
Court cases from 1947, 1948, and 1952 that “unequivocally establish” that motions under
both Rules 50(a) and 50(b) must be made and denied before a reviewing court can
presume to weigh the evidence. 22 Since the appellant had not formally renewed its
motion under Rule 50(b) before the trial court, the Federal Circuit should have been as
“powerless” as the district court was to grant a new trial. 23 Thus, the Supreme Court
maintained, just because one is litigating a patent case does not free that litigant from the
obligation to comply with this particular procedural hurdle.
D. Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.

¶10

Illinois Tool 24 operates as a bit of an exception to the recent trend, thereby proving
the rule regarding the trajectory and tone of the Supreme Court’s recent patent
jurisprudence. 25 In this case, a unanimous Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s opinion,
concluding that “the presumption of market power in a patented product” should not
21

Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 398–99.
Id. at 398–401.
23
Id. at 404.
24
547 U.S. 28 (2006).
25
Similarly, Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005), serves as an exception
that nevertheless proves the rule. In Merck, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision and
remanded for further proceedings—as per the trend described here. But the issue in the case simply did not
allow for the kind of condemnatory tone evident in several of the Supreme Court’s recent patent-law
opinions. Merck involved the proper interpretation of a relatively recent statutory exemption to the longstanding definition of patent infringement embodied in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Thus, the Court had no basis to
harangue the Federal Circuit for failing to follow an older Supreme Court precedent—although, in
explaining its decision to reverse, the Court did invoke Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661
(1990). But the Court in Eli Lilly had merely declined to limit the infringement exemption to submissions
under particular statutory provisions that regulate drugs, whereas Merck addressed the specific issue
“whether uses of patented inventions in preclinical research, the results of which are not ultimately
included in a submission to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), are exempted from infringement by
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).” 545 U.S. at 195. The Federal Circuit had found that the section 271(e)(1) safeharbor provision did not apply to the accused infringer because the testing in question was not clinical
testing whose results would be supplied to the FDA; rather, the Federal Circuit had reasoned, the testing
had involved “general biomedical research to identify new pharmaceutical compounds.” Id. at 201 (quoting
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The Supreme Court
concluded that the Federal Court’s reading of the statutory exception was overly narrow and that the
statutory exemption should instead be understood to encompass “all uses of patented inventions that are
reasonably related to the development and submission of any information under the FDCA.” Id. (emphasis
retained). The Court then remanded the case for a sufficiency-of-the-evidence review based on the “proper
construction of § 271(e)(1)” that the Court had just adopted. Id. at 208. The net result of the decision, as
with all others discussed here, was to narrow the rights of patent holders.
22
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“survive as a matter of antitrust law,” since, due to an act of Congress, that presumption
had already met its demise in patent law. 26 The Court’s holding rests expressly on the
conclusion that the legitimacy of tying arrangements should not be affected simply
because “a tying product is patented.” 27 In this respect, the opinion reflects the trend
described here. What is markedly different is the Court’s gentle tone.
¶11
In reversing the Federal Circuit, the Court had no cause to chastise the Federal
Circuit for blazing new territory because, as the Supreme Court notes, the Federal Circuit
had made “a careful review of the ‘long history of Supreme Court consideration of the
legality of tying arrangements’” and had then placed “special reliance” on seminal
Supreme Court antitrust decisions from the 1940s. 28 Indeed, Illinois Tool repeatedly
quotes with approval the Federal Circuit’s deferential statements regarding its “duty . . .
to follow the precedents of the Supreme Court until the Court itself chooses to expressly
overrule them.” 29 One could hardly ask for more humility from a subordinate.
Accordingly, in Illinois Tool, the Court was able to proceed magnanimously, pursuing in
measured terms “a fresh examination of the history of both the judicial and legislative
appraisals of tying arrangements” and ultimately bringing the rules for proving a tying
claim involving a patented product in line with modern dictates for all other cases
involving such arrangements. 30
E. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C.
eBay 31 stands in stark contrast to Illinois Tool. With eBay, the Court pointedly
rejected the Federal Circuit’s established position regarding injunctions, holding
unanimously that an injunction should not automatically issue upon a finding of patent
infringement as per the standard interpretation of key patent statutes. 32 Instead, the
Supreme Court directed district courts to weigh the same four factors traditionally used
to determine whether an injunction is warranted.
¶13
In retrospect, it is telling that the Supreme Court’s order granting the writ of
certiorari in eBay directed the parties to brief the following issue: “Whether this Court
should reconsider its precedents, including Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper
Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908) . . . ?” 33 Continental Paper Bag did not play any
meaningful role in the briefing presented to the Court in arguing for or against granting
certiorari; rather, the Supreme Court’s decision to underscore the existence of this 100year old Supreme Court case in its order telegraphs its perception that the Federal Circuit
had ignored (what should have been binding) precedent. In any event, the eBay petitioner
¶12

26

547 U.S. at 31 (emphasis added).
Id.
28
Id. at 32–33.
29
Id. at 33.
30
Id.
31
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
32
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2002) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee . . . of
the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention . . . .”); 35 U.S.C.
§ 283 (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance
with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the
court deems reasonable.”).
33
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), cert. granted, 546 U.S. 1029 (U.S. Nov.
28, 2005) (No. 05-130) (emphasis added).
27
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and many amici who urged the Court to hear the appeal effectively characterized the case
so as to arouse the Court’s ire against the Federal Circuit and the latter’s view that
proving infringement created a virtually irrebuttable presumption that an injunction
would issue. 34 And the strategy worked.
¶14
The text of the Court’s eBay opinion begins with the word “Ordinarily.” 35 Indeed,
the decision regarding how to secure an injunction is based entirely on the understanding
of what is “ordinarily” done—under “well-established,” “familiar,” and “traditional
equitable considerations” embodied in several Supreme Court cases cited in the majority
opinion. 36 That is, the Court made its decision to smack down the Federal Circuit’s
decision to reverse the district court’s initial denial of a permanent injunction, because the
Federal Circuit had not undertaken the “ordinary” analysis, but had instead applied a rule
that the Federal Circuit itself had developed in patent cases, which eBay characterizes as
“a major” and unjustified “departure” from the ordinary. 37 The Court pointedly explains
that the Federal Circuit’s error is its “categorical” assertion that, once infringement and
validity are found in the patent holder’s favor, denying permanent injunctions is
“unusual,” “exceptional,” and “rare;” that is, the Federal Circuit’s perception that patent
cases are a breed apart is, according to eBay, the very linchpin of the lower court’s
error. 38
¶15
Some Justices even felt moved to scold the Federal Circuit for failing to see that
doling out injunctions to prevailing patentees encourages some firms to seek patents (and
the bargaining chip associated with the threat of an injunction) “not as a basis for
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.” 39 This
particular reprimand is intriguing since it is the U.S. Constitution that affords patentees
the exclusive right to obtain licensing fees from those who would use the patentee’s
invention; and because it is a monopoly right, a patent holder can lawfully refrain from
offering anyone a license or from producing any goods embodying that patent. 40 As the
34

See, e.g., Brief of America Online, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130) (arguing that “[t]he Federal Circuit’s decision to
require injunctions virtually automatically upon a finding of patent infringement departs radically from the
traditional standard governing injunctive relief”).
35
eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
36
Id. at 391–92.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 393–94.
39
Id. at 396 (Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., concurring).
40
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006) (the patent statute makes clear that it is neither “misuse” nor an “illegal
extension of the patent right” for a patentee to “refuse[] to license or use any rights to the patent”); see also
In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“There is ‘no reported case
in which a court has imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent.’”) (citation
omitted); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he antitrust laws do
not negate the patentee’s right to exclude others from patent property.”); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645
F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that there is no liability arising from a patentee’s refusal to license its
patents); Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d 344, 354 (D. Conn. 2005) (“A patent owner is
not required either to sell licenses for use of its patents or to permit others to act as its agent for licensing
end users.”) (citation omitted); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 740, 748
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Defendants correctly point out that patent holders have no duty to grant licenses, and
that Bayer’s failure to grant a license therefore can not form the basis of a cause of action under any state’s
antitrust laws.”) (citation omitted); but see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 30–31
& nn.110–115 (2007) (“[T]here are numerous imaginable scenarios that involve conduct that goes beyond a
mere refusal to license a patent and could give rise to antitrust liability. . . . Conduct going beyond a mere
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Supreme Court itself observed over forty years ago, “[a] patent empowers the owner to
exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly.” 41
Apparently, several Justices, whose ideological inclinations run the gamut, had been so
affronted by the Federal Circuit’s efforts to protect those who would obtain licensing fees
under their patents that they lost sight of the Court’s own historic understanding that a
patent monopoly is not conditioned on the promise that the patentee will produce and/or
sell goods. Instead, that monopoly is a function of the Framers’ express directive that
Congress pass laws “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.” 42
F. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
¶16

In MedImmune, with Justice Thomas as the lone dissenter, the Supreme Court
reversed the Federal Circuit’s dismissal of a declaratory judgment action for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. 43 The Federal Circuit had required that, before seeking
declaratory relief under the patent laws, a party must have actually breached the operative
license agreement before filing suit. But the Supreme Court decided that the Federal
Circuit had dismissed the case based on an improper premise derived by ignoring an old
Supreme Court decision that the current Supreme Court felt was directly on point.
¶17
The facts relevant to MedImmune are fairly straightforward. The parties had
entered into a license agreement whereby Genentech had granted MedImmune the right
to make, use, and sell an antibody that the agreement stated was covered by an issued
patent and a pending patent application. Despite the agreement that it had signed and its
decision to continue paying royalties under the agreement that it then sought to
invalidate, MedImmune filed a declaratory judgment action, contending that its accused
product did not infringe any valid Genentech patent claim. The district court held, and
the Federal Circuit affirmed, that dismissing the declaratory judgment claims was
required by the Federal Circuit decision in Gene-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 44 which stands
for the proposition that a licensee, having executed a license agreement, has no standing
to challenge the validity, enforceability, or scope of a patent. 45
¶18
In deciding MedImmune, the Supreme Court rejected the rule that the Federal
Circuit had announced (not long before) in Gene-Probe, which had in turn controlled
MedImmune below. The Supreme Court explained that, in deciding Gene-Probe, the
Federal Circuit had imposed an inordinately narrow interpretation on a (much older)
Supreme Court case, Altvater v. Freeman, 46 which, the Court held, should have dictated a
different result in Gene-Probe. Importantly, in deciding Gene-Probe, the Federal Circuit

refusal thus may merit scrutiny under the antitrust laws. As noted above, the terms of a license agreement
are subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act, which ‘reaches unreasonable restraints of trade effected by a
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy.’”).
41
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964) (finding that post-expiration royalties were nothing less
than an effort by the patentee to extend the term of his monopoly beyond that granted by law).
42
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
43
549 U.S. 118 (2007).
44
359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
45
Id. at 1381.
46
319 U.S. 359 (1943).
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had expressly distinguished Altvater, finding the threat of a government sanction to be the
dispositive fact in Altvater. But the Supreme Court dismissed as specious the distinction
between the threat of suit brought by the government instead of a private actor and held
that an accused infringer need not “risk treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of its
business, before seeking a declaration of its actively contested legal rights.” 47 Moreover,
the Court insisted that paying royalties under a license agreement did not imply a promise
not to challenge the patents covered by that agreement. The Court reasoned that there
should not be, and therefore is not, a legitimate difference between the litigant who fails
to break the law when facing the threat of governmental action and the litigant who fails
to breach a private contract for fear of risking an infringement suit (and the possibility of
treble damages and an injunction).
¶19
But the opinion disregards a critical question: Does it make economic or ethical
sense to execute a license agreement, wherein one agrees to pay royalties based on the
existence of certain intellectual property, and then to challenge the very basis for one’s
commitment to pay those royalties, i.e., the existence of presumptively valid, enforceable
patents by declaring war on those patents? Instead, the Supreme Court focused, once
again, on the Federal Circuit’s reliance on its own rule rather than on the Supreme
Court’s older precedent. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court even notes that the district
court, convinced that it was bound by the Federal Circuit’s Gene-Probe rule, dismissed
the case “despite its ‘serious misgivings’” about that rule. 48 Thus, in reversing the
Federal Circuit, Justice Scalia managed to shame the son by praising the grandson’s
superior sense of deference. Ironically, he did so by noting the grandson’s public critique
of the very father to whom the grandson had ostensibly deferred.
G. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.
KSR, 49 another unanimous Supreme Court decision, addresses the proper test for
ascertaining “obviousness” sufficient to invalidate a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The
decision’s net result is to make obviousness easier to prove by weakening the
requirement of an express “suggestion to combine” particular prior art references. 50
More specifically, the case addressed whether KSR had been entitled to summary
judgment based on the contention that the inventor had merely added an element to an
extant design to create a variation on an adjustable automobile pedal in a way that would
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the relevant art. The Supreme Court
reversed the Federal Circuit—which had reversed the district court. And the Supreme
Court’s reversal again relied on the invocation of an older standard, embodied in an older
Supreme Court case, Graham v. John Deere Co., 51 which the Court believed that the
Federal Circuit had (inappropriately) supplanted.
¶21
The Federal Circuit had reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of KSR
after applying its “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” or “TSM” test to analyze the lone
¶20

47

MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 133.
Id. at 135.
49
127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
50
Id. at 1734.
51
383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
48
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claim that Teleflex was asserting against KSR. 52 The Federal Circuit’s (more recently
crafted) test required proof that “some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art
teachings” existed in the prior art itself, in the nature of the problem, or in the body of
knowledge available to a person ordinarily skilled in the art. 53 During oral argument,
Justice Scalia derided the Federal Circuit’s TSM test as “irrational” “gobbledygook;” and
Chief Justice Roberts added that the test’s only value seemed to be to enhance the patent
bar’s profitability. 54 The Court’s opinion denigrates the TSM test as “contrary to § 103
and our precedents,” “rigid,” and a confining, “formalistic conception” with an
“overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued
patents.” 55 By contrast, the Court describes the analytical methodology embodied in
Graham and “our [other] cases” as “an expansive and flexible approach” and a
“functional approach.” 56 Indeed, KSR repeatedly notes that the “correct analysis” is
found in “earlier instructions” announced “over a half century” before.57 Thus, the
Supreme Court’s displeasure palpably thunders—insisting that “our precedents make
clear” that “[u]nder the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of
endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for
combining the elements in the manner claimed.” 58
¶22
KSR’s subtext appears to be that the Court simply does not believe that it is fair to
give someone a patent on an invention that any old person could see was an obvious next
step—thus, the “correct analysis” for judging obviousness, the Court seems to say, is
little more than an intuitive thing. 59 At least a court “need not seek out precise teachings
directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take
account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
employ.” 60 As a corollary, the Court implies that the Federal Circuit’s approach had been
unduly liberal and elitist in its insistence that the germane prior art be scrutinized for
evidence of some “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” as a prelude to an obviousness
analysis. Indeed, the Court’s understanding of a “person of ordinary skill in the art” in
KSR is more akin to the generic “ordinary person” that is employed as a standard in other
doctrinal areas—as when assessing the “duty of care” under tort law.
H. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.
¶23

The Microsoft opinion issued the same day as KSR. 61 While Microsoft does not
contain the same reproachful tone evidenced in KSR, the basic architecture of the holding
is the same: The Federal Circuit erred in reaching its patent-holder-protective conclusion,
and that conclusion was out of joint with an older Supreme Court decision regarding the
52

Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 Fed. Appx. 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
See Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
54
See Transcript of Oral Argument, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 041350), 2006 WL 3422210 (argued Nov. 28, 2006).
55
127 S. Ct. at 1739.
56
Id. at 1731, 1739.
57
Id. at 1739, 1742.
58
Id. at 1741–42 (emphasis added).
59
See id. at 1742.
60
Id. at 1741 (emphasis added).
61
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
53
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basic principle underlying the case. The Court tersely summarizes both the issue and its
conclusion at the outset: “Does Microsoft’s liability extend to computers made in another
country when loaded with Windows software copied abroad from a master disk or
electronic transmission dispatched by Microsoft from the United States? Our answer is
‘No.’” 62
¶24
Next, the substantive portion of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the nearlyunanimous 63 Court provides an extended discussion of a 35-year-old Supreme Court case,
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 64 that had actually prompted Congress to enact
section 271(f)—the statutory provision at issue in the Microsoft case. 65 According to the
current Court, in deciding Deepsouth back in 1972, the Supreme Court had simply
interpreted “our patent law as then written,” commenting “that it was ‘not an
infringement to make or use a patented product outside of the United States’”—even
though the accused infringer had willfully assembled and used the accused machine
outside of the United States, so as to circumvent U.S. patent law and then imported the
product that resulted from the extraterritorial use of the infringing machine. 66 Indeed, the
Microsoft opinion acknowledges unapologetically that section 271(f)(1) was “specifically
intended . . . as a response to” Deepsouth and explains that the new provision had indeed
expanded “the definition of infringement to include supplying from the United States a
patented invention’s components.” 67 Thus, the Court clarifies that Deepsouth was part of
a dialectical process whereby the Supreme Court had, in its view, simply applied patent
law “as written;” Congress, not liking the results, had then rewritten the law. Now, in
Microsoft, the Court was being asked to interpret the amended law—but would again
“resist” giving the new statutory language “an expansive interpretation.” 68 The Court
justifies its restraint by reminding that section 271(f) constitutes an exception to the
“general rule” that U.S. patent law does not apply beyond the United States: “The
presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world
applies with particular force in patent law” because this “traditional understanding” is
embedded in the Patent Act itself.” 69
¶25
To understand why the decision to apply the “general rule” may not be entirely fair
requires some context. Microsoft, in the United States, provides “master disks”
containing Windows to foreign PC manufacturers, who copy the contents onto PC hard
62

Id. at 1750–51.
Id. at 1750 (Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter and Chief Justice Roberts did not participate in the
case).
64
406 U.S. 518 (1972).
65
Indeed, in contextualizing the Deepsouth opinion in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., the Court
reached far further back to a nineteenth-century case, Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183 (1857), to justify
the holdings of both Deepsouth and Microsoft. See Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1752.
66
Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1751.
67
Id. at 1752 (quoting Fisch & Allen, The Application of Domestic Patent Law to Exported Software: 35
U.S.C. § 271(f), 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 557, 565 (2004)). The provision provides in relevant part:
Whoever . . . supplies . . . from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components
of a patented invention, . . . in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such
components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe . . . if such combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2006).
68
Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1751.
69
Id. at 1758 (emphasis added).
63
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drives. Microsoft had stipulated that the PCs, acting in concert with the software,
infringed the patent that AT&T had asserted. 70 The only issue on appeal was whether the
software on the master disks were “components” under section 271(f)(1), such that
AT&T was entitled to assert its patent rights against Microsoft; the Federal Circuit had
held that software is fairly characterized as a “component” under the statute. 71 Yet,
despite the parties’ stipulation, the Supreme Court concluded that AT&T’s patent was not
infringed by a computer “standing alone” or by software that was not yet installed—facts
that are as difficult to refute as they are inconsequential.72 That is, Microsoft does not
create Windows so that it will sit on a shelf, just as its customers (i.e., PC manufacturers)
do not buy Windows software to install on computers that no one will ever run. The
Court, however, was not moved by these practical realities. Instead, it decided that
software cannot be classified as a component “until it is expressed as a computerreadable ‘copy,’ e.g., on a CD-ROM.” 73 And having concluded that “[a]bstract
software,” detached from an activating medium “is an idea without physical embodiment,
and as such, it does not match § 271(f)’s categorization,” the Court found that software is
not a “combinable component” as countenanced by section 271(f); therefore, the Court
concluded that section 271(f) does not apply to foreign software sales because foreignmade copies of software are not “supplie[d]” from the United States—even though the
original from which the copies were made did emanate from the United States. 74
¶26
Thus, Microsoft clearly reflects the Supreme Court’s belief that patent holders’
rights (under section 271(f) or otherwise) should be construed as narrowly as possible.
What is less clear, however, is why the Court viewed AT&T’s position as requiring an
“expansive” or “dynamic” interpretation of section 271(f) when the statute was
specifically enacted to expand the reach of U.S. patent law. 75 Similarly, it is unclear why
the Court felt compelled to dare Congress to make any further “adjustments” to the
provision that “it deems necessary or proper” to close any further “loophole” or “other
arguable gaps” “if it finds such action warranted”—as Congress had tried to do by
enacting section 271(f) in the first place. 76 Yet, the last section of Microsoft is devoted
entirely to schooling AT&T—and really the Federal Circuit that it was reversing—on the
Judiciary’s proper role vis-à-vis the legislative branch. While subtle, the Court’s final
directive to the Federal Circuit is decidedly acerbic: “If the patent law is to be adjusted
better ‘to account for the realities of software distribution,’ the alteration should be made
after focused legislative consideration, and not by the Judiciary forecasting Congress’
likely disposition.” 77 The rhetorical tactic of incorporating text from the Federal Circuit’s
opinion into the Supreme Court’s conclusion gives the reversal a particularly icy sting.

70

Id. at 1753.
Id.
72
Id. at 1750.
73
Id. at 1755.
74
Id. at 1755–56.
75
Id. at 1751.
76
Id. at 1751, 1759–60.
77
Id. at 1760.
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I. Quanta Computers, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.
¶27

Last June, the Supreme Court issued its most recent patent law decision in
Quanta. 78 Quanta is the Supreme Court’s first major pronouncement on the doctrine of
“patent exhaustion” in sixty-six years—since it decided United States v. Univis Lens
Co. 79 In reversing the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court again stressed the vitality of its
own, considerably older decision.
¶28
The basic concept of exhaustion—that a patent holder’s monopoly in a patented
article is relinquished once a patent holder makes the first unconditional grant to a
licensee under a U.S. patent—has been a recognized patent-law principle for over 150
years. Then, in Univis, the Supreme Court addressed how far a patent holder could go,
without implicating federal antitrust law, to retain its control over a patented product after
an initial grant had been made. The Court ultimately nullified explicit restrictions in the
license agreements between Univis, which held a patent covering a method for grinding
lenses, and its licensees. The relevant provision in these agreements required that, as a
condition of the license to buy blank lenses from Univis’s licensees, the downstream
purchasers, who actually ground the lens blanks pursuant to Univis’s patented method for
sale to consumers, had to sell those lenses at a price dictated by Univis. The United
States government sued Univis, alleging that this practice constituted an antitrust
violation. Univis argued that it had the right to condition a license to use its lens patent
and that those conditions could apply to downstream retailers. The Supreme Court
disagreed, holding that a patent holder cannot contract to expand a patent monopoly that
would otherwise have been “exhausted” upon the first authorized sale of a product
substantially embodying the patented invention. The Univis Court also emphasized that a
patentee cannot evade the antitrust laws by using the patent laws as a shield. In short,
just because a patent holder could find a willing contract partner, the patent holder could
not contract around the exhaustion doctrine.
¶29
During the sixty-six years since Univis, the Federal Circuit has carved out several
exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. For instance, the Federal Circuit has held (1) that a
patentee can contract around exhaustion by imposing clear conditions at the time of a
sale—as long as the patented article has some substantial non-infringing use; 80 (2) that
method claims are never exhausted; 81 and (3) that sales made outside the United States
are not “first sales” under a U.S. patent such that exhaustion is triggered. 82 In Quanta,
the contemporary Supreme Court addressed two of the Federal Circuit’s departures from
Univis and similar cases, holding that exhaustion applies to method, not just apparatus,
claims, and expressly denying a patent owner’s right to seek royalties after a first
authorized sale of a product that uses that method. Moreover, Quanta suggests that
patent holders cannot limit the scope of a license as it applies to those downstream of the
initial licensee—at least not to the extent previously recognized by the Federal Circuit.
¶30
From a 30,000-foot perspective, some key facts in Quanta and Univis are
analogous. But in truth, the differences between the Depression-era eyeglass lens market
78

128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).
See 316 U.S. 241, 249–50 (1942).
80
See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703, 708–09 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
81
See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rev’d by Quanta,
128 S. Ct. 2109.
82
See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
79
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and the contemporary, transnational PC market are non-trivial. In short, the complexities
and scale associated with the underlying technology, the methods for combining the
components at issue, and the economics that drive the process are incomparable.
¶31
The facts underlying the Quanta case are as follows. South Korea’s LG
Electronics (“LGE”) had entered into a broad cross-license with Intel that covered
microprocessors, chipsets, and methods for combining those products with other products
(memory and buses). Simultaneously, LGE and Intel also executed a “Master
Agreement” that sought to condition the scope of LGE’s license as to customers
downstream of Intel—but without affecting the broad license granted to Intel itself. Intel
sold processors and chipsets to original equipment manufacturers, such as Quanta, under
the LGE license. When these sales were made, Intel gave the computer manufacturers
notice that the sale did not include a license to combine those products with anything
other than Intel products. But in order to make competitively priced products, the
computer manufacturers combined the licensed Intel products with non-Intel memory and
buses to make computer systems designed for the consumer market. LGE then sued the
computer manufacturers for infringing a method patent covering the process of
combining Intel microprocessors, chipsets, memory, and buses to form a computer
system.
¶32
Carefully tracking the specific facts underlying Quanta, the Supreme Court reached
the following conclusions:
•
•
•
•
•
•

methods are embodied in products;
method claims are exhausted when a license authorizes a licensee to sell
components or products that substantially embody the patents that include
those method claims;
the first sale of a product that substantially embodies a method claim or that is
covered by an apparatus claim exhausts any patent monopoly in those claims;
the only reasonable use for the Intel products at issue in this case was to
combine them to make computer systems; 83
everything inventive was embodied in the microprocessors and chipsets that
Intel was licensed to sell to the computer manufacturers; and
once Intel sold the microprocessors and chipsets under a license, the method
claims that covered combining those products with others to make a computer
system were exhausted because the latter process did not involve any
innovation. 84

Most notably, the Supreme Court adopted Quanta’s position, thereby rejecting the
Federal Circuit’s view that method claims can never be exhausted. 85 Again, the Court’s
opinion conveys downright indignation, stating that the Federal Circuit’s view of
exhaustion “would allow patent holders to avoid exhaustion entirely by inserting method
claims in their patent specifications.” 86 The Court insists that its holding will, by
83
Interestingly, this same premise—that the components only function as part of a computer system—
was rejected in Microsoft v. AT&T, 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1755 (2007).
84
See, generally, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109.
85
Id. at 2113.
86
Id. at 2117.
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contrast, prevent artful drafting from making “an end-run around exhaustion” that would
in turn permit the grave “danger” that “any downstream purchasers of [a computer
system] could nonetheless be liable for patent infringement.” 87 Yet, the Court’s
reasoning ignores the practical reality that no patentee is likely to sue the end-user of a
consumer good that practices a patent—particularly when the patent only covers a small
feature within a subcomponent of an apparatus that is made up of numerous complex
subcomponents, as is the case in virtually all patent infringement suits that accuse
personal computers.
¶33
Further, the Quanta decision disregards the patent-law-specific meanings of several
key terms, such as “components” and “license.” Quanta rests on the premise, for
instance, that, where “essential features” are present in a device or a device “substantially
embodies” those features, any method claims covering that device are exhausted. 88 But
this premise ignores the long-standing notion that all limitations in a patent are equally
important such that there really can be no “essential” components among limitations
setting forth the elements of a given invention. 89 Similarly, the Quanta decision uses the
term “license” as if it means “permission” instead of recognizing that, in the context of
intellectual property law, a “license” specifically means an affirmative grant of rights
made under a patent or copyright. 90
¶34
Quanta ultimately raises as many questions as it resolves. For example, the
opinion does not address whether LGE’s attempt to limit the scope of the license
downstream of its licensee would have been successful if the limitation/condition had
been in the cross-license that governed the transaction between Intel and Quanta instead
of in the separate “Master Agreement” between LGE and Intel; the opinion only hints at
such a possibility. 91 Likewise, Quanta does not address whether a “first sale” must occur
in the United States in order to trigger exhaustion—even though the same sale could be
the subject of infringement allegations regardless of where the first sale occurred.
Further, Quanta does not resolve whether breach of contract damages may still be
available where a licensee breaches an express condition in a written license even if the
patentee cannot seek to recover from the licensee under patent law because exhaustion
will have cut the patentee off from any patent-related royalty stream. 92 Additionally,
Quanta does not address the related doctrine of implied license—and thus an implied
license can still be disclaimed in an agreement with a licensee. 93

87

Id. at 2118.
Id. at 2120 (emphasis added).
89
A patent examiner is supposed to review each claim—and corresponding limitations—in a patent for
compliance with every statutory requirement for patentability. See generally U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 707 (2008) (citing 37 C.F.R. 1.104(b)).
90
Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2122.
91
Id. at 2121–22 (“In any event, the provision requiring notice to Quanta appeared only in the Master
Agreement, and LGE does not suggest that a breach of that agreement would constitute a breach of the
License Agreement. Hence, Intel’s authority to sell its products embodying the LGE Patents was not
conditioned on the notice or on Quanta’s decision to abide by LGE’s directions in that notice.”).
92
Id. at 2122 n.7 (“We note that the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta does not necessarily limit
LGE’s other contract rights. LGE’s complaint does not include a breach-of-contract claim, and we express
no opinion on whether contract damages might be available even though exhaustion operates to eliminate
patent damages.”).
93
See, e.g., Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. PDI Comm’ns, 522 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding implied
license derived from express licenses between patentee and manufacturers).
88
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The Court’s opinion does, however, send at least one unambiguous message: The
Supreme Court had a case on point (Univis), yet, the Federal Circuit had inappropriately
departed from that case’s pellucid pronouncements. Moreover, as in eBay, the Supreme
Court’s irritation, arising from its perception that the Federal Circuit had gone off the
reservation, is quite conspicuous. The opinion begins with the assertion that: “For over
150 years this Court has applied the doctrine of patent exhaustion to limit the patent
rights that survive the initial authorized sale of a patented item.” 94 Then, the Supreme
Court unequivocally announces that the Federal Circuit is being thoroughly rebuffed:
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the [exhaustion] doctrine
does not apply to method patents at all and, in the alternative, that it does not
apply here because the sales were not authorized by the license agreement. We
disagree on both scores. 95

The opinion is then peppered with phrases emphasizing the “longstanding” nature of the
doctrine that is embodied “in 19th-century cases” that have “repeatedly held” positions
contrary to the Federal Circuit’s.96 Thus, the Quanta decision, in categorically reversing
the Federal Circuit on two exhaustion-related points but nonetheless avoiding numerous,
interrelated nuances associated with the doctrine, is less about illuminating a substantive,
patent-law doctrine and more about establishing dominance.
III. PSYCHOANALYZING THE COURT’S CONSISTENCY
¶36

The recent patent cases discussed above reflect the Supreme Court’s inclination to
shift the balance of power away from patent holders by relying on older, simpler
precedents—although these precedents did not necessarily arise in analogous
circumstances or even in patent infringement disputes. Of course, the Supreme Court’s
implicit message that a patent case is just a case like any other is, in one sense, quite
correct. That is, litigation is litigation, and “thinking like a lawyer” (or like a judge) is
critical to navigating any lawsuit judiciously. But that does not mean that it is
appropriate or “fair” to treat legal issues in a Procrustean manner. 97 There may be sound
reasons why a specialized court has crafted special rules that deviate in certain ways from
similar, broadly applicable principles that were formulated by a court of general
jurisdiction.
¶37
As elegant as the Court’s consistency may be, that very consistency across the
ideological divide is suspect because it suggests a preference for simplicity in a context
that is not especially amenable to simplicity. Indeed, the complexity of intellectual
property law is what prompted Congress to create the Federal Circuit—not because this
94

Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2113.
Id. (emphasis added).
96
Id. at 2115.
97
This metaphor is derived from the story of Procrustes, a mythological Greek miscreant who offered
unsuspecting guests a special iron bed in which to sleep. If the guest was too tall, Procrustes would
amputate the excess length; and if the guest was too short, he would stretch his victim on the rack until the
guest “fit” the bed. But in fact, no one ever fit the bed because Procrustes would adjust it upon sizing his
victims up from afar so as to ensure a mismatch. Procrustes was eventually outsmarted by Theseus, the
same Greek hero responsible for founding Athens and for giving Oedipus, the ostracized king of Thebes,
his final resting place.
95
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complexity is a “problem” to be eradicated, but because complexity is a core
characteristic of patent law. The Federal Court’s mandate has been to tease out the
complexities in a doctrinal area whose underlying subject matter is peculiarly dynamic
(and thus complex): human innovation. Thus, by insisting that patent cases be treated
like any other, by issuing holdings that routinely rest on older, simpler precedents, and by
rejecting subject-specific nuance, the Supreme Court has implicitly challenged a key
justification for the Federal Circuit’s very existence.
¶38
Why would the Supreme Court feel compelled to pursue such a fundamental
assault upon the Federal Circuit?
¶39
If one accepts the premise that the institutional relationship between the Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit is analogous to a father-son relationship, 98 the Supreme
Court’s recent patent opinions, when considered collectively, expose a pronounced desire
on the part of the father to make it clear to the son who is boss. In turn, the uncanny
repetition of this reminder from the patriarch suggests a degree of anxiety about the son’s
growing significance. This anxiety is quite understandable if one considers the context in
which this particular father has found himself: A generalist confronting concepts that
have evolved in an esoteric area of law replete with its own peculiar argot, in a cultural
epoch where technological innovation moves at mind-boggling speed, and where
businesses’ intellectual property is often more valuable than hard assets whose worth is
far easier to quantify. The labyrinth of arcane, patent-specific jurisprudential concepts is
decidedly difficult to negotiate—even for profoundly intelligent human beings such as
Supreme Court Justices. And even profoundly intelligent, accomplished patriarchs can
be reluctant to admit that their upstart sons may occasionally craft a better, more nuanced
solution to a complex problem.
¶40
Members of the Highest Court in this land would likely bristle at the suggestion
that their approach to adjudicating appeals in patent cases reflects a struggle for
dominance between father and son. A traditional Freudian, however, would quickly
counter that denial is a natural, initial response to being confronted with uncomfortable
truths buried in one’s psyche. And at least within the hermetic realm of psychoanalysis,
the road to self-awareness requires that one recognize the patterns and symbols that
reveal the repressed concerns that lie beneath the surface of consciousness. Only by
exhuming the artifacts of the unconscious and exposing them to the light of Reason can
one see, and then address, the latent anxieties that unwittingly affect one’s behavior—in
ways that may not be as facially reasonable as the Ego is inclined, a priori, to believe. 99
And, again, according to the psychoanalytic model, symbolic clues as to what is really
afoot occasionally float to the surface when we let our guard down, thereby beckoning us
to unearth them. 100 The subterranean exploration recommended here focuses on the
98

This metaphor is intentionally gendered male because, in both Freudian analysis and in the Greek
myths upon which Freud relied, the psychological dynamic between father and son is quite distinct from
the dynamic between father and daughter. For instance, in Oedipus at Colonus, Oedipus’s daughters
dutifully serve and nurture Oedipus throughout his years in exile, whereas his sons pursue their own selfinterested quest for power. But the descriptions of the Supreme Court as “father” and the Federal Circuit as
“son” in this article have nothing to do with the gender of the courts’ members and certainly are not
intended to imply any slight to the esteemed female members of the courts.
99
See generally SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID (James Strachey ed., Joan Rivierre trans.,
Norton 1960) (1923).
100
See generally SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (Abraham Arden Brill trans.,
Allen & Unwin 3d ed. 1937) (1899); SIGMUND FREUD, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE (Abraham
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psyche of the Supreme Court qua father, and that father’s decision to reassert its
influence in a particular area after being otherwise engaged for the preceding fifty years.
But can Freud really provide a decent road map for this exploration?
Freud might well have been interested in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 101 a
post-Quanta by-product of the dialogue between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court. This recent, unanimous, en banc Federal Circuit decision suggests that the son
may be cognizant of at least one of the patterns in the father’s recent patent-law
jurisprudence described above. In Egyptian Goddess, the Federal Circuit discarded its
own 20-year-old “point of novelty” test for design patent infringement and reverted back
to a 137-year-old Supreme Court standard articulated in Gorham v. White. 102 The latter
test was, heretofore, described only in that lone 1871 case. The old Gorham/new
Egyptian Goddess test asks what an “ordinary observer,” upon comparing two competing
designs, would recognize as infringing. Thus, the Federal Circuit has resurrected a
broader, simpler standard—in a development that resonates with irony since this standard
should actually make it easier for a certain category of patent holders to prevail, whereas
the Supreme Court’s recent decisions have all resulted in curtailing patent holders’ rights.
Also, Freud might have deemed it significant that this case is seemingly appeal-proof—
because the plaintiff successfully attacked the legal test at issue, yet, the Court still found
that the patentee’s design had not been infringed; therefore, although the defendants lost
on the legal issue, the infringement claim against them was dismissed. 103
But the fact is, Freud, who believed that a father’s death was “the most important
event, the most poignant loss, of a man’s life” 104 and who sired six children, had precious
little to say regarding the father’s perspective. Freud’s most famous theory—of the
Oedipal conflict—was formulated shortly after his own father’s death and focuses almost
exclusively on the son’s perspective. And in Moses and Monotheism (1938), written
during the last year of Freud’s life, Freud still focused primarily on the son’s perspective
(specifically, the longing of Christianity, the son, to supplant Judaism, the “retrograde”
father-religion). But assuming that Freud was right that all sons experience feelings of
profound ambivalence about their fathers—loving them, hating them, desiring to
supersede them, and feeling guilty about the resulting conflict simultaneously—then
surely the son who grows up to become a father must experience his own anxieties
attributable to the belief that his children unconsciously long to take over. Because Freud
himself did not address this likelihood, “inverse Freud” will have to do.
Freud based his Oedipal theory on a Greek mythic hero, Oedipus. Yet, Oedipus did
not simply kill his father and then blithely marry his mother. Indeed, he did not know his
biological father; he killed a stranger in an act of self-defense. He later married a
Arden Brill trans., T.F. Unwin 3d ed. ltd. 1920) (1901).
101
543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
102
Id. at 672 (citing 81 U.S. 511 (1871)).
103
Members of the Federal Circuit have, in more purely deferential terms, commented on the High
Court’s recent interest. For instance, Chief Judge Paul R. Michel has suggested that “the Federal Circuit
has had a good amount of time to wrestle with fundamental issues of patent law and has developed a body
of law on those fundamental issues. The time is ripe for the Supreme Court to review the way we have
resolved those issues. It’s neither surprising nor worrisome.” Marcia Coyle, Critics Target Federal
Circuits, NAT. L. J., Oct 16, 2006, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=900005551683.
104
SIGMUND FREUD, Preface to the Second Edition of SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF
DREAMS at xxvi (Abraham Arden Brill trans., Allen & Unwin 3d ed. 1937) (2d ed. 1908).
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somewhat older woman who was, unbeknownst to either of them, his mother and the
widowed queen of the stranger whom Oedipus had killed some time before. And by the
time Oedipus learned the messy truth about the events that had culminated in his
marriage and coronation, he himself was a father. The self-inflicted punishment that
followed—which entailed gouging his eyes out and then wandering in exile—was
dramatic, but it was not the end of Oedipus’s story. Oedipus grew old. And the great
tragedian, Sophocles, who wrote the play that so inspired Freud, 105 also wrote a play
about the last days of this ill-fated hero, Oedipus at Colonus, which focuses on a very
different kind of identity crisis: an older man’s fear of insignificance and his quest for
absolution.
¶45
The exegesis of the High Court’s recent patent cases presented here places special
emphasis on the tone and rhetorical tactics that characterize these decisions. In this
sense, this Article follows the lead of Hamlet (a favorite in certain psychoanalytic
circles). 106 When Hamlet decides to employ a roving band of actors to put on a play in
hopes of catching “the conscience of a king,” Hamlet provides the Players with some
sound advice. He urges them to:
Suit the action to the word, the word to the action; with this special observance,
that you o’er-step not the modesty of nature: for any thing so o’erdone is from
the purpose of playing, whose end, both at the first and now, was and is, to hold,
as ‘t were, the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own
image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure. 107

Holding “as ‘t were the mirror up to” the Supreme Court’s patent opinions reveals a
dynamic that is not explained simply by the internal logic of any discrete case. And
implicit in this exercise is the suggestion that something may be (slightly) rotten in the
state of Denmark. 108 While it is indisputable that stare decisis is a bedrock principle of
the Anglo-American legal system, a specialized court may have legitimate reasons for
deviating or extrapolating from older decisions that emanated from a court of general
jurisdiction. And the Court could be unduly privileging stare decisis over sensitivity to
the sui generis aspects of patent law. In short, the Court’s consistent insistence that it is
unfair to treat patent cases differently from others may not really be fair—if “being fair”
means proceeding with detachment from bias and presuppositions and with special
sensitivity to the peculiar nuances of a particular context.
¶46
The Supreme Court has recently denied the writs of certiorari in a number of
appeals of high-profile patent disputes. 109 Yet, the current term will include at least one
105

SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS THE KING.
See, e.g., ERNEST JONES, HAMLET AND OEDIPUS (London: V. Gollancz 1949).
107
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc 2, ln 17–24.
108
This observation in itself is hardly novel since criticism of the Federal Circuit has been mounting
over the past two years in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s rising interest in patent cases. See, e.g.,
Coyle, supra note 103 (noting concern about the Federal Circuit’s own relatively high reversal rate in
patent cases—approximately 30–35%—when other appellate courts in reviewing district court cases
reverse only about 20% of the time).
109
The Court has, for instance, denied writs of certiorari in EchoStar Comm’n Corp. v. TiVo Inc., 516
F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 306 (2008) (appealing the Federal Circuit’s conclusion
that a $73.5 million jury award against EchoStar for infringing a patent on time-shifting television signals
was supported by substantial evidence), and in In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
106
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(quasi) patent case: Carlsbad Technology Inc. v. HIF Bio Inc. 110 A principal reason for
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari would seem to be to correct what the Supreme
Court sees as an error on the Federal Circuit’s part. But if this proves to be the case with
Carlsbad—and the Supreme Court reverses the Federal Circuit on the jurisdictional
question presented—then this would also mean that the Court would be diverging for the
first time from the trend of scaling back the rights of patent holders and the scope of the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction. Whether the Court will agree to hear any of the appeals in
patent cases that are still pending—and whether any opinions that follow would fit the
pattern described in this article—remains to be seen. In any event, the subtext of the
Supreme Court’s remarkably consistent approach to patent law in recent terms merits, in
all due “fairness,” further scrutiny.
IV. CONCLUSION
¶47

The net result of the remarkable consistency of the Supreme Court’s recent patent
opinions may be to weaken the patent system, which could in turn hinder the kind of
innovation that the system is meant to foster. Such a development would not be
particularly good—at least not from the perspective of the Granddaddy of all Progenitors,
the Framers of our nation’s founding document, who directed Congress to go to special
lengths to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” 111 Certainly, the leitmotif apparent in the Supreme Court’s patent cases
and the increasingly reproachful tone through which its opinions are conveyed warrant a
closer look.

129 S. Ct. 70 (2008) (appealing the Federal Circuit’s ruling that signals embedded with information that
allows those signals to place digital watermarks on electronic data files are unpatentable because they do
not fit into any of the four categories of patentable subject matter delineated in 35 U.S.C. § 101). However,
the cases presented to the Supreme Court recently, including Carlsbad Tech. v. Yung Shin Pharms. Indus.
Co., 508 F.3d 659 (Fed. Cir. 2007), have largely involved procedural, rather than meaty, substantive
questions of patent law.
110
On October 14, 2008, the Court granted certiorari in this case where the issue presented is whether,
after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district court’s decision to
remand a case that hinged on the question of inventorship could be reviewed; a unanimous panel of the
Federal Circuit concluded that it could not. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharms. Industrial Co., 508 F.3d
659 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 395 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437).
111
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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